Berkeley and imagination by Attfield, Robin
Philosophy
http://journals.cambridge.org/PHI
Additional services for Philosophy:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Berkeley and Imagination
R. Attﬁeld
Philosophy / Volume 45 / Issue 173 / July 1970, pp 237 ­ 239
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100063154, Published online: 25 February 2009
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/
abstract_S0031819100063154
How to cite this article:
R. Attﬁeld (1970). Berkeley and Imagination. Philosophy, 45, pp 237­239 
doi:10.1017/S0031819100063154
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/PHI, IP address: 131.251.133.26 on 12 Jul 2013
BERKELEY AND IMAGINATION
R. ATTFIELD
IN AN article in Philosophy, April, 1968,1 Roger Woolhouse observes that
in supplying 'differentiae' for ideas of the imagination as distinct from
ideas of reality, Berkeley contrives to mark off two different sorts of cases
without necessarily observing there were two Real-Imaginary distinc-
tions to be drawn. The two sorts of cases of imagination are fancy and
illusion. But Berkeley may not have been confused. 'I have not claimed
. . . that Berkeley failed to realise that ideas of the imagination fall into
two sorts, and confusedly ran these two distinctions together' (sc. the
Real-Fanciful and Real-Illusory distinctions) 'or that he did not, and I
am not sure which one should claim.'2 The difficulty of exculpating
Berkeley of confusion is at its worst in paragraph 33 of the Principles of
Human Knowledge where 'Berkeley talks as though all the ideas of the
imagination lack all the three characteristics that the ideas of sense
possess,'3 namely vividness and non-voluntariness, proper both to cases of
illusion and reality, but not fancy, and coherence, proper both to fancy
and reality, but not illusion: though it is not claimed that Berkeley asserts
what his words suggest. A defence of Berkeley would have to show he was
aware of the distinctness of fancy and illusion, and that at Principles,
paragraph 33, one kind of fancy was rightly held to lack all three charac-
teristics, without illusion coming into the picture.
In the Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous Hylas objects that
on the immaterialist thesis there is no difference 'between real things and
chimeras formed by the imagination or the visions of a dream'; all are
equally 'in the mind'.4 In reply, Philonous is careful to distinguish be-
tween waking imagination and dreams. Unlike the 'ideas of sense', 'the
ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct', and have besides
'an entire dependence on the will'. By contrast the visions of a dream are
'dim, irregular and confused' (though not 'dim' in all senses, as they may
be extremely 'lively and natural').5 The objection about imagination and
dreams has thus been dealt with, before, for the first time in this Dialogue,
illusions are mentioned. How, on the immaterialist thesis, Hylas now
asks, 'can a man be mistaken in thinking . . . an oar, with one end in the
water, crooked?'6 The reply is in terms of mistaken inferences. If the
man expects the oar to feel crooked or look crooked when taken out of the
water, present ideas will not cohere with future ideas. But there is no
suggestion that the oar illusion will be faint or voluntary like an imaginary
sun, nor irregular and confused like a dream about the sun. Illusions
are dealt with subsequent to and in isolation from both fancy and dreams,
and three Real-Imaginary distinctions are observed.
Is the Illusory similarly segregated in the Principles? Matters are less
clear, but I contend that it is. After a concentrated discussion of the
qualitative difference between ideas of reality and ideas of imagination,
an objection is put at paragraph 34, namely that 'all things that exist,
exist only in the mind, that is they are purely notional'. If so, our beliefs
will be illusory: their objects will be 'but so many chimeras and illusions
on the fancy'.7 From his reply, it is evident that Berkeley, as opposed to
the objector, distinguishes 'chimeras' and 'illusions': for the illusory
character of reality is denied, while (within non-illusory experience) 'the
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distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force'. This
has already been shown, says Berkeley, in paragraph 29, 20 and 33,
'where we have shown what is meant by real things in opposition to
chimeras or ideas of our own framing.'8 What 'real things' are here
opposed to is cases of fancy, not illusions: for it is nonsense to hold that a
man's illusions are framed by himself at will. Illusions and fancy are
kept distinct.
At this stage, then, Berkeley, purports to have been discussing in the
preceding paragraphs the Real-Fanciful and not the Real-Illusory distinc-
tion: but at paragraph 30, when 'a steadiness, order and coherence',9 is
attributed to the ideas of sense, we could reasonably look for a distinction
from objects of illusion, while fancy seems irrelevant. Yet Berkeley need
not have illusions in mind: for he talks of the 'regular train or series' of
ideas of reality, and spells out this concept not in terms of the coherence
of sight and touch which illusions lack but of the orderliness of successive
and law-governed events of determinate types. This regularity is ascribed
to the Author of nature and distinguished from the ideas 'which are the
effects of human wills' which are often 'excited at ramdom'.10 The
allusion, I suggest, is to the spontaneous and sporadic occurrence of our
imaginings, not to the disordered content of our illusions.
The same account may suffice for the description in paragraph 33 of
ideas excited in the imagination as 'less regular . . . and constant' than
'real things'.11 Berkeley may intend the occurrence of our imaginings
rather than the quality of their objects, though 'less vivid' must apply to
the latter. But there is an alternative solution. As we have seen,
Berkeley is prepared to speak of dreams as 'irregular and confused'. But
dreams are not 'excited in the imagination' nor exactly 'creatures of the
mind'. Yet those trains of thought we call day-dreams share both the
voluntariness of our imaginings and the irregular sequence of scenes
characteristic of dreams. Perhaps at paragraph 33 Berkeley had in mind
the character of this kind of fantasy; which could also be said to be 'less
vivid' than 'real things' in that we do not expect imaginary creatures to
act towards us in the manner of real ones. On this reading of Berkeley
only the Real-Fanciful distinction is in question, and the type of fancy
intended lacks vividness, non-voluntariness and coherence.
One further point argues less confusion on Berkeley's part than may
appear; in the main discussion it is from 'ideas of the imagination', not
'imaginary ideas' that 'ideas of reality' are distinguished. Now we often
call illusory objects imaginary, but, except in expressions like 'a figment
of the imagination', we rarely think of them as objects of the faculty
'imagination'. The imagination is hardly in a position to be misled; nor,
I suspect, does Berkeley so abuse language as to suggest otherwise. Only
by analogy is illusion a type of imagination: in distinguishing 'imagination'
from 'reality', fancy and not illusion is what Berkeley means.
University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire,
Cardiff
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